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CURRENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Moiwana Village Case: A New Trend in
Approaching the Rights of Ethnic Groups
in the Inter-American System
CLAUDIA MARTIN*

Abstract
Moiwana Village is the second case to be decided by the Inter-American Court on Human
Rights against Suriname in which the victims are members of an ethnic community that
descends from'Bush Negroes' or 'Maroons', namely escaped former slaves who established new
autonomous communities in the eastern part of Suriname. In contrast to its prior judgment, in
Moiwanathe Court shows a striking evolution in its case law regarding the treatment of ethnic
or group rights. This approach, which may be traced back to previous case law on the rights of
indigenous communities, affords an enhanced protection to members of an ethnic community
in the light of their disadvantaged position as a vulnerable group and taking into account the
ancestral traditions followed by the community. After the Moiwana case, the Court decided
Yalce Axa and Yatama, two cases regarding indigenous and ethnic communities in which this
tribunal consolidated its approach towards the protection of these vulnerable groups.
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Moiwana Villagev. Surinameisthe second case decided by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (Inter-American Court or Court) against Suriname in which the
victims are members of an ethnic community that descends from the so-called 'Bush
Negroes' or 'Maroons', namely former slaves who managed to escape enslavement
and established new autonomous communities in the eastern part of Suriname. In
Aloeboetoe,' the first case decidedby the Court, six members ofthis ethnic community
were killed by Surinamese soldiers, while a seventh victim died in hospital after being shot and left for dead at the time of the extrajudicial executions. The difference
in the scope of these two judgments, decided more than ten years apart, shows a
striking evolution in the case law of the Court regarding the treatment of tribal or
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recognized international responsibility for the extrajudicial executions of the victims and, in consequence,
the Court accepted the facts as stated in the petition submitted by the Commission.
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ethnic group rights. While in Aloeboetoe the Court dismissed arguments requesting
this tribunal to take into account the fact that the victims were members of an ethnic
community with strong communal ties when assessing the impact of the human
rights violations for purposes of reparation,2 in Moiwana Village the Court interpreted the scope of the rights of the members of the village as well as the reparations
awarded to them in the light of the particular characteristics of the Maroon ethnic
community. As demonstrated by the Court's continued consideration of a group's
unique characteristics in deciding cases regarding indigenous and/or ethnic communities, it is clear that the evolution continues to unfold beyond Moiwana Village.
i. BACKGROUND
The origin of the Court's new approach reflected in Moiwana Village may be traced
back to the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community case, in which the Court, for
the first time, provided for the protection of the rights of members of an indigenous
community in Nicaragua in the light of their cultural traditions and beliefs.3 In
Moiwana Village the Court extended the protection afforded to indigenous groups
to an ethnic community with similar ancestral traditions. After the Moiwana case,
the Court decided Yakye Axa 4 and Yatama,5 two cases regarding indigenous and
ethnic communities in which this tribunal consolidated its approach towards the
protection of these vulnerable groups. The relevant facts of those cases are now
provided to assist in the subsequent analysis of the Moiwana Village case.
In Yakye Axa, the Court examined Paraguay's failure to process in due time an
indigenous community's claim to regain access to its traditional lands, as ensured by
the state Constitution. The community's claim to the territory, submitted in 1993,
remained unresolved by the time the Court decided the case in 2005. Since 1993 the
community has been settled on the side of a road, in land adjacent to its ancestral
territory that lacked the most basic amenities such as access to clean water, food, and
housing. The Court held that there was no justification for Paraguay's procedural
delay of more than 12 years, which has deprived the community's members of access
to their land and their traditional way of living, and has resulted in a nutritional,
medical, and sanitary crisis that has threatened the community's integrity and
physical survival. Moreover, the state's failure to provide an effective remedy, in
addition to violating Articles 1(1), 2, 8, and 2 5 of the American Convention on Human
Rights (American Convention or Convention), has had a detrimental impact on the
community members' enjoyment of other rights protected by this treaty, particularly

2.

3.
4.
5.

I/A Court H.R., CaseofAloeboetoe et aL v. Suriname, Reparations (Art. 63 (r) American Convention on Human
Rights), Judgment of 'a September 1993, Series C No.13, para. 83. Although the Court admitted that it would
exceptionally allow for damages to be awarded to the community in a case in which it suffered direct harm,
it failed to consider the impact that the human rights violations had on the community to which the victims
belong.
I/A Court H.R., Caseofthe Mavagna (Sumo)Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,Judgment of 3 i August 2001,
Series C No. 79.
I/A Court H.R., Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,Judgment of 17 June 2005, Series C No.
125I/A Court H.R., Case ofYatama v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 23 June 2005, Series C No. 127.
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the rights to property and life. In determining Paraguay's violation of the indigenous
community's right to property, the Court stated that the close relationship between
the indigenous community and the land must be recognized and understood as the
fundamental base of their culture, spiritual life, integrity, economic survival, and
cultural preservation. Although Paraguay's domestic legislation recognized the relevance of this relationship, the state's failure to ensure a remedy to enable the
community to regain access to its traditional lands had, in practice, frustrated the
community's enjoyment of their right to property in violation of Article 21 Of
the American Convention. The Court also held that lack of access to the community's
land had deprived its members of using their traditional means of subsistence,
enjoying clean water as well as practicing ancestral treatment to heal illnesses,
which affected their right to a dignified life in contravention of Article 4(), in
conjunction with Article i(i) of the American Convention.
Consequently the Court established extensive reparations to the community by
ordering the state to realize the community's right to property, either by ensuring its
access to its ancestral lands or identifying alternative land that the state could acquire
forthat purpose. In addition, it ordered the state to create a communal fund to support
the provision of clean water and health services once the land was awarded to the
community. The Court also ordered Paraguay to create a US $950,000 fund to support
the development of educational, health, and housing projects for the community.
In the same vein, the Yatama case relates to the protection of the right to political participation of the indigenous and ethnic communities from the Autonomous
Regions of the North Atlantic (RAAN) and South Atlantic (RAAS) in Nicaragua, a
country whose multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual population is evinced
by the great variation of indigenous and ethnic communities populating its Pacific
and North Central regions, as well as the Atlantic Coast and Caribbean. In recognition of that diversity, the communities of the Atlantic Coast, for example, have a
constitutionally recognized right to preserve and develop their cultural identities, to
establish their own social structure, and to administer theirlocal issues in conformity
with their traditions. Yatama was initially created as an association to represent and
defend the interests of these communities and had successfully elected representatives to municipal and regional authorities since 1990. However, in 2000 Nicaraguan
domestic law was amended to provide that only political parties could participate
in that year's electoral process; each party would need to gather 3 per cent of the
registered population's signatures, and do so at least six months before the election.
Also, in order to acquire judicial recognition, each political party had to provide candidates from at least 8o per cent of all municipalities. Although Yatama, which met
the required standards for recognition as a political party, presented independent
candidates in the RAAN and participated in a coalition with another political party
in the RAAS, the Supreme Electoral Council rejected the candidates' participation
in a disputed decision ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice.
In the light of this decision, the Court held that the Supreme Electoral Council
had failed to comply with the minimum standards of due process as required by Article 8(I) of the American Convention because it did not provide a basis for rejecting
Yatama's candidates. Moreover, since the Supreme Electoral Council is considered
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to be an independent branch of the government in Nicaragua, its decisions are not
subject to judicial review, thereby depriving individuals of an effective means of
challenging rulings that affect their rights to political participation in violation of
Article 25 of the Convention. In addition, the Court held that under Articles 24,
i(i) and 2 of the American Convention, states have a positive obligation to adopt
measures to ensure that members of vulnerable groups exercise the rights protected by the Convention under similar conditions to other groups. The requirement
to participate as a political party in the regional elections imposed an undue burden on Yatama candidates, due to the foreign nature of this form of organization
vis-'a-vis the traditions, customs, and uses of the indigenous and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast. Furthermore, the state was unable to advance a pressing
public need that would justify this restriction. Accordingly the Court found that
the disadvantaged position in which candidates were placed violated their right to
political participation enshrined in Article 23 of the American Convention, in conjunction with Articles 24, i () and 2 of that treaty. It also concluded that the rejection
of Yatama's candidates in the elections also imposed unjustified restrictions on the
right of the members of the indigenous and ethnic community to participate and to
choose candidates who represented their interests.
With regard to reparations, the Court awarded compensation for damage caused
to the candidates who were unable to participate in the 2000 elections. It also ordered
the state to amend its electoral legislation to ensure that members of indigenous and
ethnic communities are guaranteed the right to participate in the political process.
Finally the Court ordered the state to introduce into its domestic legislation a judicial
means of challenging decisions adopted by the Supreme Electoral Council.
2. THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
2.1. The facts of the case
In Moiwana Villagev. Suriname,' the events took place during Sergeant-Major (later
Lieutentant-Colonel) D6sir6 (Desi) Bouterse's military control of Suriname from
1982 to 1987, in the midst of an internal armed conflict with the Jungle Commando,
an insurgent guerrilla group that rose up to oppose the authoritarian government
and which operated mainly in the eastern part of the country, where the victims
in this case resided. On 29 November 1986 the village belonging to the N'djuka
community, an ethnic group descended from former slaves, was surrounded, its
property burned, and many of its inhabitants killed; those whose lives were spared
escaped to surrounding territories, including of French Guyana. Among the dead
were at least 39 men, women, and children whose remains have not been recovered,
and the perpetrators have not been brought to justice by the Surinamese government.
The surviving victims and civil society organizations, such as Moiwana '86 and the
Moiwana Association, persistently and frequently petitioned the government for
redress. Their concerns were heightened in the light of the approval of an amnesty
law that would ultimately pardon the perpetrators. However, despite their efforts,

6.
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the state failed to carry out an investigation into what had transpired in Moiwana
Village and, consequently, to award appropriate reparations.
Preliminary objections
Initially Suriname raised five preliminary objections challenging the jurisdiction
of the Court to hear the case. The state's objections included jurisdictional as well
as admissibility issues. With regard to the first objection, Suriname alleged that the
Court lacked jurisdiction rationae temporis to review the petition because the facts
of the case had occurred before the state ratified the American Convention and
accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction. The Court, in following precedent
case law, reaffirmed the application of the principle of non-retroactivity of treaties,
which bars this tribunal from examining acts and omissions that transpired before
the Convention entered into force and before the state accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court. Moreover, it reiterated that the only exceptions to this
principle are alleged violations of the Convention that are of a continuing nature.
The Court's analysis of its jurisdiction rationaetemporis in recent case law has been
controversial, particularly with respect to states that have introduced temporal or
similar limitations or reservations to their declarations recognizing the compulsory
jurisdiction of this tribunal.8 Contrary to those cases, however, Suriname's declaration was submitted without express limitations, and thereby poses no problems of
interpretation for the Court.
The Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the facts related to the
military attack on the village of Moiwana and the deaths of the members of the
N'djuka tribe that resulted from the attack, given that they took place before Suriname's ratification of the American Convention and the subsequent recognition of
the Court's jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it asserted jurisdiction to examine the alleged
violations arising out of Suriname's failure to investigate the killings, including
the victims' lack of access to an effective remedy and the suffering undergone by
members of the community as a consequence of the continuous denial of justice.
Moreover, the Court ruled that the forcible displacement of the community from
its ancestral lands and their resulting inability to enjoy their communal property
were continuous violations, thereby asserting jurisdiction to hear these claims as
well. In sum, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to review the alleged violations
of several provisions of the American Convention, including Articles 8(i), 25, and
i(i) with regard to the right to a remedy and the lack of appropriate investigation,
Article 5 with respect to the suffering undergone by the community members, Article 22 in relation to the forceful displacement, and Article 21 in connection to the
right to property.
Second, Suriname argued that the petitioners had failed to exhaust domestic
remedies before submitting the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Inter-American Commission or Commission), as required by Article 46(i)(a)
2.2.

7.
8.

The attack on the village took place on 29 Nov. r986. Suriname ratified the American Convention and
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on 12 Nov. 1987.
See, inter alia, I/A Court H.R., Case of Serrano-CruzSisters v. El Salvador, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of
23 November 2004, Series C No. ii8.
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of the American Convention. 9 The Court, siding with the Commission, concluded
that the state had not raised this objection in a timely fashion and consequently had
waived its right to challenge the admissibility of the petition. It is well-established
practice and precedent in the Inter-American system that states must file admissibility objections, including that on the exhaustion of domestic remedies, in the
first stages of the proceedings, otherwise their right will be considered to have been
tacitly waived.'0
Third, Suriname alleged that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the petition
because the Commission filed the complaint following the expiration of the threemonth period authorized by Article 51(1) of the Convention." The Court noted that
the Commission had agreed twice to extend the state's deadlines to reply pursuant to
Suriname's request and on the state's written acknowledgment that the extensions
would not prevent the Commission from submitting the case to the Court if no
settlement was reached. Therefore, in following precedent, the Court rejected the
objection and held that 'when a party to a case adopts a position that is either
beneficial to it or detrimental to the other party, it cannot subsequently, in virtue of
the principle of estoppel, assume a contradictory position'.' 2
Another preliminary objection that deserves analysis touches on the Court's
power to review alleged violations of rights protected by the American Declaration
on the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration or Declaration). The Statute of the Inter-American Commission,' 3 supported by a well-established practice
accepted by states, provides that the American Declaration is the instrument utilized
by the Commission to monitor compliance with human rights standards in a state

9.

r0.
r1.

12.

13.

Article 46(I)(a)provides:'Admissionbythe Commission ofa petition or communication lodged in accordance
with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: a. that the remedies under domestic
law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international
law.'
See Moiwana Village v. Suriname case, supra note 6, para. 49 and additional cases cited therein.
Article 51(1) provides that if, within a period of three months from the date of the transmittal of the report
of the Commission to the states concerned, the matter has not either been settled or submitted by the
Commission or by the state concerned to the Court and its jurisdiction accepted, the Commission may, by
the vote of an absolute majority of its members, set forth its opinion and conclusions concerning the question
submitted for its consideration.
See Moiwana Village v. Surinamecase, supra note 6, para. 58. See also I/A C.H.R., Case ofNeira Alegria et al. v.
Peru, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1i December 1991, Series C No. 13, paras. 34-5; Case ofCaballero
Delgadoand Santana, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 January 1994, Series C No. 17, para. 45.
Article 20 of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights establishes:
In relation to those member states of the Organization that are not parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights, the Commission shall have the following powers, in addition to those designated in Article

18:
a. to pay particular attention to the observance of the human rights referred to in Articles I, II, III, IV, XVIII,
XXV, and XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man;
b. to examine communications submitted to it and any other available information, to address the government of any member state not a Party to the Convention for information deemed pertinent by this
Commission, and to make recommendations to it, when it finds this appropriate, in order to bring about
more effective observance of fundamental human rights; and,
c. to verify as a prior condition to the exercise of the powers granted under subparagraph b. above, whether
the domestic legal procedures and remedies of each member state not a Party to the Convention have been
duly applied and exhausted.

THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN

SYSTEM

party to the Organization of American States that has not yet ratified the American
Convention. Once a state ratifies the Convention, however, this treaty becomes the
applicable law. In the case under analysis, since many of the facts transpired before
Suriname ratified the American Convention (for example the deprivation of the
victims' right to life), the Commission found in its merits report several violations of
rights protected by the Declaration. Moreover, given that the state's violation of the
right to an effective remedy and its failure to investigate continued after Suriname
had ratified the American Convention, the application of this treaty displaced the
Declaration, causing the Commission to address those violations under Articles 8
and 25 of the said treaty. The Commission only argued violations of the American
Convention in its submissions before the Court.
In its preliminary objection Suriname argued that the Commission's report,which
found violations of rights protected by the American Declaration additional to those
argued by the petitioners, was detrimental to the state's defence. In response, the
Court held that the American Convention grants this tribunal the jurisdiction to
interpret and apply the provisions of this treaty but does not bestow on it the
power to review the Commission's findings on the American Declaration. The
relevance of this conclusion lies in the fact that the jurisdiction of the Court, a
tribunal created by the American Convention to hear violations of the American
Declaration, has never been decided squarely in a case. In Cantos, the Commission
argued violations of the American Declaration, but the Court refused to examine the
facts, stating that it lacked jurisdiction rationae temporis to review the allegations.' 4
Conversely, in Moiwana the Court appears to suggest that, even though it may
use the American Declaration to interpret the American Convention under Article 29 of that treaty,' 5 it lacks jurisdiction to deal with direct violations of the
Declaration.
Finally, Suriname argued that the Commission had failed to provide the state
with all the relevant parts of the complaint submitted by the petitioners, thereby
depriving the state of essential information to mount a solid defence of its position.
However, the Court rejected the preliminary objection, stating that due to Suriname's
failure to appear before the Commission prior to the Commission's issuance of
admissibility and merits reports, the state, by its own action, had failed to exercise
its right to defence at the appropriate stages of the proceedings.

14.
r 5.

I/A Court H.R., Case ofCantos v. Argentina, Judgment of 28 November 2002, Series C No. 97, para. 48.
Article 29 of the American Convention provides:
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and
freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein;
b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State
Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party;
c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or
d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other
international acts of the same nature may have.
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In sum, the Court rejected the preliminary objections submitted by Suriname and
found jurisdiction to deal with certain ongoing violations of rights protected by the
American Convention.
Merits
Before examining the substantive rights violations alleged by the petitioners, it
is important to note that this case involved victims who belonged to an ethnic
community with strong communal traditions and views. Therefore the petitioners and the Commission struggled in their arguments to distinguish whether the
victims should be treated as individuals whose rights had been violated or as part
of a group with distinctive standing, thereby reflecting a contradiction between
notions of individual and group rights. The decision of the Court shows a similar
contradiction in the approach it follows, for example, with regard to the right to
property. The tension between individual and group rights can also be observed in
cases in which the Court addressed the rights of indigenous communities.' 6 One
reason for the contradiction may lie in the Commission's narrow interpretation
of Article 1(2) of the American Convention, which provides that 'person' means
every human being. The Commission has consistently refused to review cases on
the basis of its jurisdiction rationae personaein which the alleged victims were not
individual persons, but associations, corporations or similar entities.' 7 However, it
has never analysed whether an ethnic or indigenous community could claim rights
as a group, that is to say, beyond the harm suffered by its individual members. Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that in the decision of admissibility in Moiwana,
the Commission made it clear that the victims were the inhabitants of the community and not the community as such.' 8 Likewise, in Yakye Axa, the Commission
underlined that '[a]s its alleged victims, the petition identifies individual persons',
indicating in a footnote that those victims include each member of the indigenous
community.' 9
Another development that it is important to consider with regard to the substantive analysis of the case is the broader scope of protection provided to vulnerable
groups by the Court's recent jurisprudence. Starting with cases involving children,
the Court has interpreted the rights of the American Convention in the light of
the particular status of this category of victims and has afforded them enhanced
protection.2 0 Most recently, the Court has extended broader protection to members
of indigenous communities. In YakyeAxa, for example, the Court stated that it would
take into account the particular characteristics that make up the cultural identity of
2.3.

r6.
17.

See YakyeAxalndigenous Community case, supra note 4.
See, inter alia, I/A Commission H.R., Bernard Merens and family v. Argentina, Report No. 103/99, Petition,
27 September '999, Annual Report '999; EliasSantana et al. v. Venezuela, Report No. 92/03, Petition 453/0,

r8.

23 October 2003, Annual Report 2003.
I/A Commission H.R., Village of Moiwana v. Suriname, Report No. 26/oo, Case 11.821, 7 March 2000, Annual
Report 1999, para. r6.

19.

I/A Commission H.R., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet Lengua People v. Paragua,Admissibility,
Report No. 2/02, Petition 12.313, 27 February 2002, Annual Report 2002, para. 31.

20.

See, e.g., I/A Court H.R., Caseof the Gomez Paquiyauribrothers v. Peru, Judgment of 8 July 2004, Series C No. ro,
paras. 117 and 170; Case ofBulacio v. Argentina, Judgment of i8 September 2003, Series C No. roo, para. 126;
and Case of Children'sRehabilitationv. Paraguay,Judgment of 2 September 2004, Series C No. 112, para. 147.
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this indigenous community when interpreting the provisions of the Convention.2
Although not expressly stated in Moiwana, the Court followed a similar approach
and interpreted the rights of the members of this ethnic community in the light of
the fact that they are a vulnerable group deserving enhanced protection under the
American Convention.
With regard to the merits, the Court initially addressed the consequences affecting the members of the community of the state's failure to investigate and
to ensure redress. Similarly to Serrano-Cruz Sisters,2 2 in Moiwana the Court subscribed to the approach that failure to carry out an effective investigation might
entail additional violations of rights protected by the American Convention. In
particular, the Court found that the ongoing denial of justice suffered by the surviving members of the community, in addition to depriving the victims of the
right of access to an effective remedy, as ensured by Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, resulted in ongoing violations of their rights to humane treatment (Article 5), freedom of movement (Article 22), and property (Article 21) granted by
that treaty.
First, the Court found that Suriname's failure to carry out a proper investigation of
the events that resulted in the death of 39 members of the community, as well as the
forced displacement of the survivors, constituted a violation of their right to physical, mental, and moral integrity on several grounds. In previous case law the Court
had ruled that a state's failure to carry out an investigation regarding the disappearance or death of a victim, and the mistreatment of his or her remains, or the failure to
return the victim's body to his or her next of kin, constituted a violation of their right
not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, as protected by Article 5 of the American Convention.2 3 In Moiwana the Court, taking into account the
cultural background of the community, found that the lack of a serious and thorough
investigation, in addition to causing anguish to the victims' next of kin, had a severe
impact on the surviving villagers, given the notions of justice and collective responsibility shared by the N'djuka people. Under this cultural tradition, if a member of
the tribe is arbitrarily deprived of his or her life, his or her spirit does not rest until
justice is accomplished. The living members of the community have a duty to search
for justice because if this obligation is not fulfilled, both the survivors and the dead
will suffer. Moreover, the state's failure to return the remains of the villagers killed
in the military attack or to indicate where they were buried constituted, according
to the Court, an additional source of suffering for the N'djuka people because it prevented the community from honouring their deceased loved ones according to their
traditions. The N'djuka people follow specific and complex rituals that must be conducted on the death of a community member; failure to comply with those rituals

21.
22.
23.

See YakyeAxalndigenous Community case, supra note 4, para. 51.
I/A Court H.R., Case oftheSerrano-CruzSisters v. El Salvador,Judgment of i March 2005, Series C No. 120, para.
''3.
See, e.g., I/A Court, Caseofthe Street Children (Villagrin Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment of r9 November
1999, Series C No. 63, para.174; CaseofBdmaca Veldsquez v. Guatemala, Judgment of 2 5 November 2000, Series
C No. 70, para. r65; Case ofJuanHumberto Sinchez v. Honduras, Judgment of 7 June 2003, Series C No. 99, para.
102; Case ofl9 Merchantsv. Colombia, Judgment of5 July 2004, Series C No. 1o9, paras. 210-17.
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is considered to be a profound moral transgression that may anger the spirits of the
individual who died and the other ancestors of the community, leading to'spiritually
caused illnesses' that can affect the whole community. The facts also demonstrated
that the relationship between the N'djuka community and its traditional lands is
essential for the spiritual, cultural, and material survival of its members. Therefore
the prevailing impunity that forced the members of the Moiwana community to remain separated from their ancestral land inflicted an additional cause of anguish on
the N'djuka people, preventing them from practising their customary means of subsistence and livelihood. Thus the Court concluded that Suriname's failure to carry
out an effective investigation caused the Moiwana community members to endure
significant emotional, psychological, spiritual, and economic hardship amounting
to a violation of Article 5(I) of the American Convention in relation to Article i(i) of

the treaty.
Next, the Court addressed the impact of the lack of investigation in relation to the
forced displacement of members of the Moiwana Village from their ancestral lands
and found that there existed a violation of their right to freedom of movement. The
Court noted that until justice was obtained the members of the community would
not return to reside on their lands. According to their traditional beliefs, as long
as the perpetrators of the killings are not identified and punished, the community
members are unable to appease the spirits of their deceased relatives and purify
their ancestral land. Moreover, the ongoing impunity creates for the members of the
community a situation of continuous fear for their physical safety if they return to
their homeland. Suriname challenged the alleged violation of their right to freedom
of movement, arguing that there was no legislation or policy in place preventing
the members of the community from returning to their country or their village.
The Court, however, considering the traditional beliefs of the community and the
ongoing risk to the safety of its members, concluded that the lack of investigation
into the 1986 massacre that forced the displacement of the villagers de facto impedes
them from moving freely within the state and from choosing their place of residence.
Moreover, it deprives those members who are still exiled in French Guyana from
their right to enter and remain in their country. Thus the Court found that there is
a violation of the right to freedom of movement, as protected by Article 22 of the
American Convention. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the UN
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, apparently considered by this tribunal
as a codification of rules of customary international law, 'illuminate the reach and
content' of Article 22 in the context of forced displacement.2 4 This approach, which
relates forced displacement to the right to freedom of movement, was recently
followed by the Court in Mapiripcin Massacre, a case against Colombia, where the
Court found that the forced displacement of the surviving victims as a result of the
state's failure to ensure their safe return to their homes constituted a violation of
their human rights.2 5

24.
25.

See Moiwana Village case, supra note 6, para. III.
I/A Court H.R., Case oftheMapiripinMassacrev. Colombia, Judgment of r5 September 2005, Series C No. 134.
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Third, the Court held that Suriname's failure to ensure an effective investigation
also entailed a violation of the right of the community to use and enjoy their traditional lands. The Court applied its previous holding in the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community case, which recognized indigenous groups' communal right to
property, under Article 21 of the American Convention,2 6 to the tribal Moiwana
community. Although this community is not indigenous to the region, N'djuka
clans settled in Moiwana Village in the nineteenth century and its members continued to live in the community until the 1986 attack, thereby developing 'a profound
and all-encompassing relationship to their ancestral lands'.2 7 For that reason, the
members of this community, like the indigenous groups, have a concept of property
ownership that is not centred on the individual, but rather on the community as a
whole. Moreover, the Court stated that the Moiwana community members' lack of
formal legal title to their traditional lands was not an obstacle for them in obtaining official recognition of their communal ownership; in fact, as provided in the
Court's precedents, 'mere possession of that land should suffice' for that purpose.2 8
In sum, the Court concluded that the inability of the members of the community
to return to the village, which continues to be abandoned since the 1986 attack,
deprives them of the use and enjoyment of their traditional lands. Thus there is an
ongoing violation of the right to property as provided by Article 2 1 of the American
Convention.
Finally, in following prior case law, the Court found that the state's failure to
investigate effectively what had transpired in the village of Moiwana, as well as
its failure to punish the perpetrators of the attack, entailed additional violations of
Articles 8(i), 25, and i(i) of the American Convention. Although the amnesty law
passed in 1989 was not applied to the facts of the case, the Court anticipated that
application of this law would not serve to excuse a state's non-compliance with the
Court's orders to investigate and punish the perpetrators of human rights violations.
The Court concluded that in order to redress the wrongs done to the victims, the
state remedy must consist of 'an effective, swift investigation and judicial process,
leading to the clarification of the facts, punishment of the responsible parties, and
appropriate compensation of the victims'.2 9
Reparations
As part of the reparations under Article 63(I) of the American Convention, 30 the
Court followed its consistent practice of awarding monetary and non-monetary
reparations. With regard to monetary reparations, the Court established, on grounds
2.4.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Mayagna(Sumo)Awas Tingni Community case, supra note 3.
See Moiwana Village case, supranote 6, para. 132.
See Mayagna(Sumo)Awas Tingni Community case, supra note 3, para. I51.
See Moiwana Village case, supranote 6, para. r66.
Article 63(1) of the American Convention provides: 'If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a
right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences
of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party'
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of equity, an amount for each surviving victim as redress for material and moral (pain
and suffering) damages. As in other cases with multiple victims, determining the
beneficiaries of the compensation proved challenging for the Court.3' In this respect
the Court reiterated that, for purposes of compensation, victims must be identified
during the course of its contentious proceedings and before the final judgment on
reparations is issued. The identity of victims can usually be established through
an official document such as a birth certificate or 'family book'. However, since
members of the Moiwana village do not necessarily have identity documents or
were never registered with the national authorities, the Court granted more latitude
to the victims in this case and authorized that they might be identified through
statements before a state official by a leader of the community and by two additional
persons who could clearly attest to the individual's identity.
With regard to non-monetary reparations the Court, recognizing the victims'
right to know about the circumstances of the massacre (right to truth), first ordered
the state to investigate the events complained of, prosecute and punish those responsible, and publicize the results of the investigation so that Surinamese society
would be informed of the facts that ensued in this case. Next, the state had to use
all existing technical and scientific means to locate and identify the remains of the
victims killed during the attack and deliver them to their next of kin so that they
could be honoured according to the N'djuka tradition. In the light of its decision
regarding the violation of the right to property, the Court ordered the state to adopt
all the measures necessary to ensure the delimitation, demarcation, and collective
titling of the ancestral lands of the community and refrain from actions that would
affect the existence, value, use, or enjoyment of that property until the rights of the
community were secured. The process had to be carried out with the participation
and informed consent of the victims, as well as that of the members of other, neighbouring N'djuka villages and indigenous communities. Furthermore, it ordered the
state to guarantee the safety of community members who decided to return to Moiwana by sending governmental representatives every month to assess the situation
of the returnees and undertake any immediate measure, if so required, to ensure the
rights of the villagers.
In addition to providing for individual monetary redress, the Court ordered the
state to establish a developmental fund of US $1,200,000 to invest in health, housing,
and educational programmes for the Moiwana community members. The actual
projects to be implemented wouldbe decidedby a committee created for that purpose
and composed of three members nominated by the victims and the state. Finally,
as a measure of satisfaction, the Court requested the state publicly to recognize
international responsibility for the facts that had occurred in this case, issue an
apology to the Moiwana community members in the presence of the leader of the
N'djuka people, and build in a suitable public location a monument honouring the
victims.
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3. CONCLUSION
The Moiwana Village case represents a new step in the evolving case law of the Court,
affording enhanced protection to members of ethnic communities in the light of
their disadvantaged position as a vulnerable group and taking into account the
ancestral traditions respected by these communities. A similar approach was subsequently followed in Yakye Axa, where the Court held that the scope of the rights
of the members of an indigenous community in Paraguay had to be determined considering the vulnerable status of this community. Accordingly, the state must ensure
the access of an indigenous community to its traditional lands or to a comparable
territory where it can exercise its right to property according to its ancestral customs
and uses; by providing access to its lands, the state will also ensure the community's
members' enjoyment of their right to a dignified life. Likewise, in Yatama the Court
decided that, under the principle of equality under the law, Nicaragua had to take
into account the customs and traditions of the ethnic and indigenous communities
that populate this state when establishing the rules that regulate access to political participation. The state must ensure that the vulnerability of these groups is
not exploited to their disadvantage and that the communities' interests are fairly
represented in the political spectrum of the state.
Furthermore, with regard to reparations, Moiwana Village appears to consolidate
a trend towards awarding extensive 'community reparations' in cases in which indigenous or ethnic groups, as well as their members, have been affected as a result
of human rights violations established by the Court. This notion of 'community
reparations' appears to reveal the Court's intention to embrace a more collective
approach regarding victims that perceives redress as going beyond traditional understandings of individual compensation. In a similar vein, the Court in Yakye Axa
ordered the state to make reparations that were 'communal' in nature, including
granting the community's access to a collective enjoyment of the right to property
and the creation of developmental funds to support basic medical, housing, and
educational services. In Yatama, although the candidates who were unable to participate in the 2000 elections received individual monetary compensation, the Court
awarded broader collective reparations by ordering the state to amend domestic legislation regulating access to political participation in the light of the traditions and
customs of the existing indigenous and ethnic groups in Nicaragua. Through that
amendment the state must ensure that these communities are able to participate in
the political process and compete on an equal footing with other, more traditional
groups.
Lastly, it is worth noting that beyond the legal developments, Moiwana Villageand
the two other cases mentioned in this paper are also very relevant from a symbolic
and political standpoint. It is well known that the members of ethnic and indigenous
communities in the Americas remain excluded from mainstream participation and
representation. Consequently, access to an international tribunal with the moral
authority to address issues of inequality, and order states to redress long-accepted
practices of discrimination against these vulnerable groups, serves multiple purposes. First, decisions such as those adopted by the Inter-American Court ensure
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that indigenous and ethnic communities have access to justice when a fair process
is denied at the domestic level. Second, reparations awarded in those decisions always have a broader impact than the individual case, particularly with regard to the
amendment of existing legislation or the adoption of policies to regulate aspects
that have not been contemplated in existing municipal laws or practices. Finally,
decisions of this nature may spearhead a broader debate within states regarding
the disadvantages faced by members of certain vulnerable groups in their ordinary
lives. In the long run, awareness of these issues may contribute to ensuring that in
multiethnic societies, such as those existing in Suriname, Paraguay, and Nicaragua,
all the different voices are heard and represented in the process of consolidating
democratic political processes in those states.

